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WHEN LAW FREES US TO SPEAK
Danielle Keats Citron** & Jonathon W. Penney*
A central aim of online abuse is to silence victims. That effort is as
regrettable as it is successful. In the face of cyberharassment and sexualprivacy invasions, women and marginalized groups retreat from online
engagement. These documented chilling effects, however, are not
inevitable. Beyond its deterrent function, the law has an equally important
expressive role. In this Article, we highlight law’s capacity to shape social
norms and behavior through education. We focus on a neglected dimension
of law’s expressive role: its capacity to empower victims to express their
truths and engage with others. Our argument is theoretical and empirical.
We present new empirical research showing cyberharassment law’s
salutary effects on women’s online expression. We then consider the
implications of those findings for victims of sexual-privacy invasions.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, a cybermob descended upon Leslie Jones, the Ghostbusters
actress and Saturday Night Live cast member. Trolls and hackers targeted
Jones with sexist and racist abuse.1 Tweets featured doctored photos of
Jones with semen on her face. Harassers compared Jones to an ape with
menacing photos to match. Jones’s website was hacked; its contents were
replaced by photographs of her license and passport, fake nude photographs
of Jones, and a video tribute to a dead zoo gorilla.2 Jones subsequently shut
down her Twitter account.3 Friends described Jones as “rattled” and “shellshocked.”4
Jones’s experience is reminiscent of far too many others. In 2014, a
hacker published more than 500 private sexually explicit images of female
celebrities online, which had been stolen from victims’ email and iCloud

1. AMANDA LENHART ET AL., DATA & SOC’Y RESEARCH INST., NONCONSENSUAL IMAGE
SHARING: ONE IN 25 AMERICANS HAS BEEN A VICTIM OF “REVENGE PORN” 3 (2016),
https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/Nonconsensual_Image_Sharing_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
28QW-28YK]; Abby Ohlheiser, Leslie Jones Was the Victim of a Hack, Reportedly
Exposing Private Documents and Nude Photos, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/08/24/leslie-joness-websitegoes-offline-after-reportedly-being-hacked/ [https://perma.cc/VT6J-NXZ9]; Katie Rogers,
Leslie Jones, Star of ‘Ghostbusters,’ Becomes a Target of Online Trolls, N.Y. TIMES (July
19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/20/movies/leslie-jones-star-of-ghostbustersbecomes-a-target-of-online-trolls.html [https://perma.cc/FQ65-LDN5].
2. Sandra Laville et al., The Women Abandoned to Their Online Abusers, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/11/women-onlineabuse-threat-racist [https://perma.cc/7LZF-KMEL] (explaining that comments on Black
Lives Matter’s Facebook pages contain “racism, sexism, and homophobia”); Abby
Ohlheiser, The Leslie Jones Hack Used All the Scariest Tactics of Internet Warfare at Once,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
26,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theintersect/wp/2016/08/26/the-leslie-jones-hack-used-all-the-scariest-tactics-of-internetwarfare-at-once
[https://perma.cc/
6BMT-YRJM] (explaining how women of color, in particular, are subjected to racism and
sexism online).
3. LENHART ET AL., supra note 1, at 3; Rogers, supra note 1.
4. Maurice Cassidy, Leslie Jones Reacts to Nude Photos Leak: Devastated by Scandal
as Katy Perry Defends Comedienne’s Privacy, INQUISITR (Aug. 25, 2016),
https://www.inquisitr.com/3451796/leslie-jones-reacts-to-nude-photos-leak-devastated-byscandal-as-katy-perry-defends-comediennes-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/8TT2-2DBN].
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accounts.5 Actress Jennifer Lawrence told Vanity Fair: “I can’t even
describe to anybody what it feels like to have my naked body shoot across
the world like a news flash against my will.”6 She made clear that the
publication of her nude photos without consent amounted to a “sexual
violation.”7
These attacks exemplify the online abuse that victims face. Such attacks
usually amount to cyberharassment or cyberstalking—the persistent
targeting of an individual with threats, defamation, and privacy invasions
that causes severe emotional distress or the fear of physical harm.8 Rape
and death threats are common.9 Defamation typically involves allegations
that victims are prostitutes or have sexually transmitted infections.10
Privacy invasions typically implicate sexual privacy11 and involve
“doxxing.”12
Online abuse has a “totalizing and devastating impact” upon victims.13
As one of us (Penney) has empirically proven, online abuse has a profound
“chilling effect.”14 The central aim of online abuse is often to silence
victims, to punish them for speaking out, and to drive them from public
life.15 And, as this Article will explore, it works.
5. LENHART ET AL., supra note 1, at 3; Joseph Serna, Man Convicted of Hacking Gmail
and iCloud Accounts of at Least 30 Celebrities in L.A., L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-phishing-scam-conviction-20160928-snapstory.html [https://perma.cc/26U3-FWPT].
6. LENHART ET AL., supra note 1, at 3; Sam Kashner, Both Huntress and Prey, VANITY
FAIR (Nov. 2014), http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2014/10/jennifer-lawrence-photohacking-privacy [https://perma.cc/F64F-W32M].
7. LENHART ET AL., supra note 1, at 3; Kashner, supra note 6.
8. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 6–8 (2014); Mary Anne
Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 657–58 (2012). See generally PEW
RESEARCH CTR., ONLINE HARASSMENT (2014), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/14/2014/10/PI_OnlineHarassment_72815.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QLU67TD].
9. CITRON, supra note 8, at 5–6.
10. Id. at 24, 27, 46.
11. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
2019).
12. Nellie Veronika Binder, From the Message Board to the Front Door: Addressing
the Offline Consequences of Race- and Gender-Based Doxxing and Swatting, 51 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 55, 58 (2018).
13. CITRON, supra note 8, at 29; see also Citron, supra note 11 (manuscript at 43–44)
(detailing examples of the impact and chilling effects of online abuse).
14. The term “chilling effects” describes the idea that certain actions, by public or
private actors, may “chill or deter people from exercising their freedoms or engaging in legal
activities.” Jonathon W. Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use,
31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 125–26 (2016) [hereinafter Penney, Chilling Effects]; see also
Jonathon Penney, Internet Surveillance, Regulation, and Chilling Effects Online: A
Comparative Case Study, 6 INTERNET POL’Y REV., May 26, 2017, at 1, 3 [hereinafter Penney,
Internet Surveillance]. For other important scholarly work on chilling effects, see NEIL
RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 107,
179–80, 185 (2015); Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1633, 1657 (2013); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment:
Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 730–31 (1978).
15. CITRON, supra note 8, at 196 (speaking about the need for law to play a role where
“one group of voices consciously exploits the Internet to silence others”); EMMA A. JANE,
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Because online abuse disproportionately impacts women and
marginalized communities, so does the silencing that it produces.16 As
online abuse continues apace, women and marginalized groups are forced
offline.17 This endangers deliberative democracy, which depends upon
contributions from diverse voices and perspectives—particularly groups
historically excluded from the “marketplace of ideas.”18
These “chilling effects” are not inevitable. As a start, we note that law
has a crucial expressive function in combating online abuse.19 As one of us
(Citron) has argued, law can teach us that cyberharassment is harmful,
wrong, and illegal.20 Through its lessons, law can change the behavior of
everyone involved in the legal process—the perpetrators themselves, law
enforcers, judges, and victims.21
In this Article, we shed light on a neglected dimension of law’s
expressive role—its encouragement of victims to stay engaged online rather
than retreating into silence. We make both a theoretical and empirical case
for these potential expressive effects, including new empirical research to
MISOGYNY ONLINE: A SHORT (AND BRUTISH) HISTORY 68–69 (2017) (discussing how
“cyberhate” is used to silence women); Caitlin E. Lawson, Platform Vulnerabilities:
Harassment and Misogynoir in the Digital Attack on Leslie Jones, 21 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y
818, 821 (2018) (noting how online harassment and abuse, including the Leslie Jones case,
is deployed to silence women).
16. See CITRON, supra note 8, at 13–19; Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks,
Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 385 (2014) (“[T]he
nonconsensual disclosure of a person’s sexually explicit images chills private
expression . . . .”); Citron, supra note 11 (manuscript at 19); Mary Anne Franks, Beyond
‘Free Speech for the White Man’: Feminism and the First Amendment, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (Cynthia Bowman & Robin West eds., 2019
forthcoming)
(manuscript
at
29),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3206392 [https://perma.cc/UF9V-ZPS7]
(“[E]vidence abounds of the chilling effects of harassment and other forms of abuse.”).
17. CITRON, supra note 8, at 1–4, 8–9; Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in
Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 374–75, 391 (2009); Ari
Ezra Waldman, Social Safe Spaces, 96 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 3–
4) (“Prominent women and members of other marginalized groups are leaving these spaces.
That is not only regrettable; it is dangerous for democracy.”).
18. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 102 (2009); Danielle
Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Four Principles for Digital Expression (You Won’t
Believe #3), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1365 (2018) (“[N]ot everyone can freely engage
online. This is especially true for women, minorities, and political dissenters who are more
often the targets of cyber mobs and individual harassers.”); Citron, supra note 17, at 399
(“Society suffers a great loss when it loses women from the online marketplace and
discourse.”); Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake News, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 845,
860 (2018) (“[T]he loss of this deep engagement can have deleterious effects on politics,
policy, and democracy.”).
19. See generally Citron, supra note 17. In this Article, we build on our prior work to
develop the way we understand law’s expressive role and its actual impact on the ground.
20. Id. at 393, 408. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
21. See, e.g., Jane Aiken & Katherine Goldwasser, The Perils of Empowerment, 20
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 139, 169 (2010); Citron, supra note 17, at 377, 411–12 (arguing
that law can change how law enforcement sees and responds to online abuse, how judges
sentence defendants, and how victims might see themselves as wronged and report online
abuse to authorities).
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support this claim. We conclude by extending our analysis to laws
combating invasions of sexual privacy.22 Our work aims to enrich
expressive law theory and scholarship with empirical and theoretical work
supporting law’s expressive role.23
I. THEORY AND PRACTICE
Understanding the theory and practice of expressive law begins with
asking very basic questions about the law. Those questions include some of
the most foundational: Why do people follow the law? What properties
command or encourage that compliance?
A. Situating Expressive Theory
Conversations about legal compliance have long followed diverging
paths.24 For deterrence theorists, people comply with the law because
ignoring it would be costly.25 Law, in other words, changes behavior by
sheer force of coercion. For legitimacy theorists, people obey the law
because they view law as worthy of their compliance.26 Said another way,
people comply with law’s mandates because they view law as legitimate.
Scholars who emphasize law’s expressive role, as we do, have joined this
long-running debate.27 While scholars have long explored law’s expressive
power,28 more recent work has illuminated law’s impact on human
behavior.29 Expressive theorists argue that law shapes social norms by
changing the social meaning of behavior.30 Law educates us about what is
22. See Citron, supra note 11 (manuscript at 54–60).
23. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman, The Expressive Function of Trade Secret Law: Legality,
Cost, Intrinsic Motivation, and Consensus, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 177, 178–79 (2009);
Emily Ryo, On Normative Effects of Immigration Law, 13 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 95, 101–02
(2017); Susan Yeh, Laws and Social Norms: Unintended Consequences of Obesity Laws, 81
U. CIN. L. REV. 173, 174 (2012).
24. See Alex C. Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, Expressive Law and the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1061, 1061–62 (2016).
25. Id. at 1061. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW (2015); Raymond
Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 765, 770 (2010).
26. See Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1061; see also TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW 19–70 (1990); Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1402,
1404–10 (2005).
27. RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS 4
(2015); Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1062.
28. See, e.g., THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 34 (1962) (explaining
that law is a “reservoir of emotionally important social symbols”); Carol Weisbrod, On the
Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 993–94 (1989).
29. Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1062.
30. Id.; see, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 943, 968–72 (1995); Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2023. See generally Elizabeth S.
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
585 (1998); Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem
and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
1 (2003); Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35
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“good” or acceptable behavior and what is “bad” or unacceptable
behavior.31 People who internalize that message change their conduct.32
For instance, antismoking laws changed public perceptions about
smoking.33 With law’s help, smoking went from being viewed as
sophisticated and exciting to undesirable and dangerous.34 Law shaped
human behavior, reducing smoking rates over time.35
Expressive law theory follows different versions and models.36 Most
relevant to our analysis is what Richard McAdams calls the “expressive
theory of law’s effects.”37 Law shapes attitudes, beliefs, and behavior
through its messages and lessons.38 Various mechanisms operate to
achieve this effect, which we will categorize as “informational” or “actionfocusing.”39
Scholarship has mostly focused on law as an informational mechanism.40
Under this view, law provides information about how people should act.41
It signals what behavior is valuable and desired and what behavior is
destructive and denigrated. As McAdams explains, “democratically
produced” laws are “positively correlated with popular attitudes.”42 Law’s
form (civil or criminal) and penalty show societal intensity around a social
value.43 Law may reflect a preexisting consensus or a shift to a new
consensus about certain activity.44

(2002) [hereinafter Geisinger, A Belief]; Alex Geisinger & Ivan E. Bodensteiner, An
Expressive Jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 77 (2007);
Alex Geisinger, Reconceiving the Internal and Social Enforcement Effects of Expressive
Regulation, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2016); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence,
Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV 349 (1997); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. McAdams, An
Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000) [hereinafter McAdams, An
Attitudinal Theory].
31. See Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1062; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2022,
2035–36, 2050–52.
32. Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1062; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2022.
33. See Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1062.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 1063–64; see, e.g., Feldman, supra note 23, at 179 (describing the various
models of expressive law theory and its mechanisms); Ryo, supra note 23, at 106–07
(summarizing multiple theories and research).
37. MCADAMS, supra note 27, at 13–16.
38. Ryo, supra note 23, at 106–07; see also Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2031.
39. McAdams largely focuses on these mechanisms but refers to the latter as
“coordination.” We treat this category as a bit broader than coordination, though we owe
much of our insights to McAdams’s important analysis. See MCADAMS, supra note 27, at 6.
Other work discusses these issues in varying ways. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 23, at
181–86 (describing four mechanisms); Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1068–70
(summarizing various expressive law theories with different mechanisms); Ryo, supra note
23, at 106–07 (describing two categories, though slightly differently).
40. Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1067–68.
41. Id.
42. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory, supra note 30, at 340.
43. Feldman, supra note 23, at 184–85.
44. Id.
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Different explanations are offered for how law’s expressive value alters
behavior. For some, law allows people to infer facts about the social costs
of conduct.45 Matching one’s actions to public sentiment enables people to
avoid the social costs of behaving in ways that would garner disapproval, or
worse.46
Another explanation is that people gradually internalize
information about societal norms.47 People change their beliefs and
attitudes because they prefer to act in ways that reflect the majority’s views.
This change may reflect a belief that obeying the law is a moral
imperative.48
Now, to the law’s action-focusing mechanism. In a phenomenon
described by McAdams as “coordination,” law provides a “focal point”
around which individuals organize their behavior.49 Legally mandated stop
lights, for instance, enable people to coordinate their driving and avoid
accidents.50 Moreover, law serves as a focal point for social change.51
When public sentiment about specific behavior is unclear, law provides
expressive clarity, and channels shifts in beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors.52
Law’s informational and action-focusing mechanisms work together.
Take laws that require dog owners to clean up after their animals.53 On
nearly every block in Dublin, one finds “Bin the Poo” signs.54 Countless
cities and towns all over the world have similar warnings. Although such
laws are rarely enforced, they achieve substantial compliance.55 Law
generates compliance by signaling societal disapproval for the failure to
clean up and by encouraging people to press others to clean up, creating a
“focal point” for non–dog owners to coordinate action.56 The confluence of
these mechanisms causes “norm cascades.”57 This embodies a basic
premise of social psychology—that when deciding how to act, people
consider how the wider group would perceive their actions.58
B. In Operation
Expressive theory has deepened our understanding of shifting social
norms around the unequal treatment of women of all races, sexual
45. Geisinger, A Belief, supra note 30, at 47 n.77.
46. Geisinger, A Belief, supra note 30, at 39–40, 47 (noting legal sanctions beyond mere
societal disapproval); Geisinger & Stein, supra note 24, at 1068.
47. Geisinger, A Belief, supra note 30, at 47.
48. Id. at 64–65.
49. MCADAMS, supra note 27, at 5; see also Ryo, supra note 23, at 106.
50. MCADAMS, supra note 27, at 5.
51. Geisinger, A Belief, supra note 30, at 46–47.
52. See id. at 64–65.
53. MCADAMS, supra note 27, at 197; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2032.
54. On a trip to Dublin, one of us (Citron) took countless photos of the “Bin the Poo”
signs—the signs were far more interesting than the ones in the United States, especially to
her then-teenage daughters.
55. See MCADAMS, supra note 27, at 197; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2032.
56. See MCADAMS, supra note 27, at 197; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2032.
57. Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2033.
58. See Geisinger, A Belief, supra note 30, at 47; McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory,
supra note 30, at 340.
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orientations, national origins, and religions.59 In the 1970s and 1980s,
judicial rulings changed the social meaning of workplace sexual harassment
from a triviality to gender discrimination.60 Class action lawsuits brought
by advocates in the battered women’s movement changed law
enforcement’s view of domestic violence from a “private family matter” to
a criminal act warranting arrest and prosecution.61
Law has helped change social attitudes toward cyberharassment of
women and marginalized communities. As with workplace sexual
harassment and domestic violence, a “cyber civil rights” approach altered
the social meaning of cyberharassment from “no big deal” to grave social
problem.62 Changes in the law galvanized public sentiment, antiharassment organizations,63 privacy groups,64 and social media
companies65 to coordinate efforts for broader social change.66
59. One of us (Citron) has used expressive theory to explain how law has the potential to
shift social norms around online abuse, just as it has in the past regarding domestic violence
and workplace sexual harassment. See CITRON, supra note 8, at 126–27; Citron, supra note
17, at 377.
60. Citron, supra note 17, at 407–08.
61. Id. at 409; see also Avlana K. Eisenberg, Criminal Inflictions of Emotional Distress,
113 MICH. L. REV. 607, 609 (2015) (using expressive theory, among other theories, to help
explain various criminal law reforms aimed at empowering victims); Ari Ezra Waldman, A
Breach of Trust: Fighting Nonconsensual Pornography, 102 IOWA L. REV. 709, 719–20,
730–31 (2017).
62. In 2008, one of us (Citron) was the first to argue that cyberharassment constituted a
civil rights problem and to offer a civil rights framework to address it. See generally Citron,
supra note 18. For further discussion, see also Citron, supra note 17, at 377; and Danielle
Citron, Yale ISP—Reputation Economies in Cyberspace, YOUTUBE (Jan. 8, 2008),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XVEL4RfN3uQ
[https://perma.cc/KG8P-WKFE].
Mary Anne Franks has been an exemplary thinker and contributor in this effort. See
generally Franks, supra note 8; Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and
Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224 (2011). For years, online
commenters and free speech absolutists dismissed that work as an overreaction to a small
problem. Citron, supra note 17, at 410–11. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Online
Engagement on Equal Terms, 95 B.U. L. REV. ANNEX 97 (2015). As the problem of online
abuse became more widespread, as it became clear that women and marginalized
communities were the majority of victims, and as victims suffered serious consequences to
their ability to work, speak, engage, and socialize, lawmakers and law enforcers began to
pay attention. CITRON, supra note 8, at 95–120.
63. See CITRON, supra note 8, at 106, 252 (describing the advocacy work of the Cyber
Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI), Jacobs, and Franks, and the role that Franks and CCRI played
in changing the law regarding nonconsensual pornography).
64. For instance, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), the oldest privacy
advocacy group in the United States, has strongly supported the work of CCRI and
advocates fighting nonconsensual pornography. Carrie Goldberg, who has served on
CCRI’s Board of Directors for years and whose legal practice is devoted to victims of online
abuse, received EPIC’s Champion of Freedom Award in 2016. Press Release, Elec. Privacy
Info. Ctr., EPIC Gives Freedom Awards to Goldberg, Kasparov, Rivest, and Wald (June 5,
2017), http://epic.org/2017/06/epic-gives-freedom-awards-to-g.html [http://perma.cc/LZQ3GB8R].
65. One of us (Citron) sits on Twitter’s Trust and Safety Council and serves on
Facebook’s Nonconsensual Intimate Imagery Task Force. Citron does not receive
compensation for that work. The Twitter Trust and Safety Council, TWITTER,
https://about.twitter.com/
en_us/safety/safety-partners.html [https://perma.cc/7KRV-S5B8] (last visited Feb. 23,
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The work of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI);67 its founder Holly
Jacobs, a victim of nonconsensual pornography; and its legislative adviser
and now-President Mary Anne Franks was crucial in this effort. Franks
wrote the first model nonconsensual pornography law.68 At that time, only
three states criminalized the practice.69 Thanks to Franks’s thoughtful
scholarship and tireless work with lawmakers, forty-one states and the
District of Columbia now criminalize the posting of nude images without
consent.70
Given changes in the law brought about by the hard work of advocates,
law enforcement began to tackle online abuse. An important step was
education. In 2014, one of us (Citron) worked with U.S. Senator Kamala
Harris, then the California attorney general (AG), to establish the Cyber
Exploitation Task Force.71 The Task Force was made up of victim
advocates, fifty major technology companies, law enforcement
representatives, and experts. Under Harris’s leadership, California created
an online hub providing resources for law enforcement officers
investigating invasions of sexual privacy, harassment, and stalking.72
There has been an increase in the enforcement of criminal law and civil
actions related to online abuse. The California AG’s office prosecuted
operators of revenge porn websites for engaging in extortion and other
crimes. Site operators were convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, encouraging
users to post nude photos of their ex-partners and charging hundreds of
dollars for the photos to be removed.73 The Department of Justice’s
Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section has prosecutors like
Mona Sedky with an expertise in cyberstalking, cyberharassment, and

2019); see also Madeline Buxton, Facebook Wants to Stop Revenge Porn Before It Begins,
but the Process Is Tricky, REFINERY29 (May 22, 2018, 11:00 AM),
https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2018/05/199800/facbook-fights-revenge-porn
[https://perma.cc/3MPS-ADXV].
66. Citron, supra note 17, at 410–11.
67. CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/ [https://perma.cc/5JB8WJEW] (last visited Feb. 21, 2019).
68. Citron, supra note 11 (manuscript at 57 n.412).
69. Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA.
L. REV. 1251, 1280 (2017).
70. Citron, supra note 11 (manuscript at 57).
71. See Press Release, State of Cal. Dept. of Justice, Att’y Gen. Kamala D. Harris, Tech
Leaders and Advocates Launch Offensive in Fight Against Cyber Exploitation (Oct. 14,
2015), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-tech-leadersand-advocates-launch-offensive [https://perma.cc/N4DP-KNCQ].
72. See id.
73. For instance, the operator of UGotPosted, Kevin Bollaert, faced charges of extortion,
conspiracy, and identity theft for allegedly urging users to post their ex-lovers’ nude photos
and then demanding large fees for the removal of each photo. Citron, supra note 62, at 98
n.6. Bollaert’s conviction signaled that extorting money from individuals whose
confidential nude images were posted without permission is an illegal enterprise. Danielle
Citron & Woodrow Hartzog, The Decision That Could Finally Kill the Revenge-Porn
Business,
ATLANTIC
(Feb.
3,
2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/02/the-decision-that-could-finallykill-the-revenge-porn-business/385113/ [https://perma.cc/JH87-GH4L].
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sextortion.74 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) followed California’s
lead by bringing an enforcement action against revenge porn site operators
for exploiting nude images shared in confidence for commercial gain.75
There has been a significant shift in the response to online abuse; in ten
years, cyberharassment went from a triviality to a crime.76 Attorneys
general like Harris devoted resources to training personnel to conduct
investigations of online abuse.77
Social media companies banned
nonconsensual pornography, threats, and other forms of cyberharassment.78
Victims, slowly but surely, felt emboldened to report online abuse to law
enforcement.
In January 2015, the esteemed civil liberties group, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF), put its reputation behind efforts to combat
cyberharassment. The EFF wrote an article highlighting online harassment
as a pressing “digital rights issue.”79 It was a big deal for a civil liberties
group to recognize that speech can silence speech.80 In our experience,
most civil liberties groups resist that argument. The EFF said to the public
that cyberharassment was not a small problem that could be ignored.81
Instead, the EFF made clear that cyberharassment was “profoundly
damaging to the free speech and privacy rights of the people targeted.”82 It
was crucial for the public’s understanding of online abuse for a civil
liberties organization to contend that online abuse silences people,
especially women and minorities, who enjoy “less political or social
power.”83 Such progress has been slow but sure.
C. Little-Noticed Expressive Effect: Victim Engagement
There is another, little-studied impact that law has in the arena of online
abuse: the empowerment of victims to speak and engage online. Though
largely neglected in expressive law scholarship,84 the idea that law has the
potential to empower the speech of victims is not new. This has been a core
74. See Citron, supra note 11 (manuscript at 55 n.396).
75. Citron, supra note 62, at 98.
76. Citron, supra note 17, at 410–11.
77. Id. at 411–12.
78. One of us (Citron) has worked closely with social media companies on their termsof-service policies related to online abuse. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
79. Danny O’Brien & Dia Kiyyali, Facing the Challenge of Online Harassment,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/
facing-challenge-online-harassment [https://perma.cc/24TU-EBAK].
80. Citron, supra note 62, at 99.
81. See O’Brien & Kiyyali, supra note 79.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. We have raised this issue previously. See Jonathon W. Penney, Can Cyber
Harassment Laws Encourage Online Speech?, in PERSPECTIVES ON HARMFUL SPEECH
ONLINE: 10, 10 (Urs Gasser et al. eds., 2017), http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/
1/33746096/2017-08_harmfulspeech.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NPZ-KFG8]; see also Citron,
supra note 17, at 412 (“[T]argeted individuals would be more likely to come forward since
reporting such incidents would not seem fruitless. This would have a salutary psychic effect
on women: they would no longer view themselves as defenseless.”).
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objective of the victim’s rights movement. Since the 1970s, advocates have
sought to give victims a greater “voice” in the criminal justice system.85 As
we have both argued, law’s expressive value includes its encouragement of
cyberharassment victims to report abuse to law enforcement.86
There has been good reason to be skeptical of this argument. Until
recently, expressive law scholarship has been rich in theory, but light on
empirical studies substantiating and exploring its varied dimensions.87
Studies showing how law’s expressive effects happen, how often, and the
scope of the change are crucial. The next Part helps fill that void by
substantiating our theoretical arguments with original empirical research.
II. LAW’S EMPOWERMENT OF SPEECH
Cyberharassment laws are often criticized for chilling speech.88 In this
Part, we make the theoretical and empirical case that law does the opposite:
cyberharassment law is more likely to encourage speech than to chill it.
This Part first discusses the theoretical implications of law’s expressive
potential to empower speech. Then, it presents the results of original
empirical research conducted by one of us (Penney).
A. Expressive Theory
As we show below, the law’s expressive value extends to victims. It
makes clear that the democratic majority disapproves of efforts to silence
and intimidate victims. It says that the public values victims’ online
85. Different legal reforms initiated in response to the victim’s rights movement, like
victim impact statements, have been justified as having important expressive meaning for
victims—that they matter in the criminal justice system and need a stronger voice.
Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 620; see also Aiken & Goldwasser, supra note 21, at 147
(discussing criminal law reforms aimed at giving victims back their “voice”).
86. See JoAnne Sweeny & John Slack, Sexting as ‘Sexual Behavior’ Under Rape Shield
Laws, 11 INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 246, 247 (2017) (noting that to address the “trend” of
cyberbulling and cyberharassment, legislatures across the country “began adopting
legislation to encourage victims to report these kinds of crimes”).
87. See Feldman, supra note 23, at 181–86; Ryo, supra note 23, at 101; Yeh, supra note
23, at 174.
88. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Challenge to Maryland Law Banning Speech That
Intentionally Seriously Distresses Minors, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 29,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/06/29/challengeto-maryland-law-banning-speech-that-intentionally-seriously-distresses-minors/
[https://perma.cc/XD5E-HNYA].
See generally Michal Buchhandler-Raphael,
Overcriminalizing Speech, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1667 (2015). One of us (Citron) and Mary
Anne Franks have argued together and separately that this argument fails to recognize how
online abuse silences speech. See CITRON, supra note 8, at 27; Citron, supra note 18, at 102;
Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 420 n.135 (2017); Citron, supra note
62, at 100; Franks, supra note 69, at 1295, 1311, 1321–22 (noting that First Amendment
fundamentalists often critique laws and ordinances that regulate speech as having a chilling
effect on protected speech); Franks, supra note 8, at 697; Franks, supra note 62, at 243.
Mary Anne Franks’s new book is a tour de force on First Amendment fundamentalism, with
a focus on online abuse. See generally MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE
CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2019).
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contributions. And it signals that behavior intending to drive victims
offline is unacceptable. Victims infer from the law that their online
engagement is valued and that their suffering matters to the public. They
internalize these messages, leading them to engage more online over time.
They feel emboldened to come forward and tell their stories.
We have seen this happen. In 2012, Holly Jacobs stopped using a
pseudonym to speak to the press about her experience with nonconsensual
pornography.89 She reclaimed her online life and started a nonprofit
organization, the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, devoted to combating online
abuse.90
When Holly Jacobs founded CCRI along with Mary Anne Franks, the
only other anti-harassment advocacy groups were Without My Consent
(WMC) and National Network to End Domestic Violence (NNEDV), which
had long fought against the abuse of digital technologies.91 In the past two
years, CCRI, WMC, and NNEDV have been joined by other activists and
groups, such as Women Against Revenge Porn, the Badass Army, and the
March Against Revenge Porn.92
Law serves to coordinate action that increases victims’ inclination to
engage online. It provides a “focal point” for victims to connect with others
interested in organizing to shift social norms. It helps individuals organize
action to fight abuse online. For the past six years, advocacy groups have
coordinated their efforts to combat online abuse.93 CCRI and WMC have
drafted joint comments to the FTC.94 They have also engaged in online
campaigns.95 In addition, advocates actively participate in email listservs

89. CITRON, supra note 8, at 105.
90. Jacobs has been celebrated for her brave and tireless work, and rightly so. In 2018,
she was named one of ten “Women of Worth” by L’Oreal. Press Release, L’Oreal Paris,
L’Oréal Paris Honors Extraordinary Women of Worth at 13th Annual Celebration; Christy
Silva of Aidan’s Heart Foundation Named National Honoree and Jaha Dukureh of Safe
Hands for Girls Honored as 2018 Karen T. Fondu Impact Award Winner (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/loreal-paris-honors-extraordinary-women-ofworth-at-13th-annual-celebration-christy-silva-of-aidans-heart-foundation-named-nationalhonoree-and-jaha-dukureh-of-safe-hands-for-girls-honored-as-2018-karen-t-fondu-impactaward-wi-300760168.html [https://perma.cc/KV5H-LM9W].
91. See CITRON, supra note 8, at 95–119.
92. See, e.g., Joseph Cox, The ‘Badass Army’ is Training Revenge Porn Victims to Fight
Back,
VICE:
MOTHERBOARD
(Mar.
14,
2018,
8:00
AM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/
article/59k7qx/revenge-porn-what-to-do-badass-army-anon-ib
[https://perma.cc/82KBQ8KL]. CCRI has also coordinated with anti-online-abuse groups outside the United States,
including in South Korea and the United Kingdom.
93. One of us (Citron) served as one of the original board members of CCRI and
remains on the board to this day. Citron also serves as an adviser to Without My Consent
(WMC). For a history of the development of CCRI and WMC, see generally CITRON, supra
note 8, at 95–119.
94. Comments of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, Inc. and Without My Consent. Inc. to
the Federal Trade Commission, Craig Brittain, FTC File No. 132 3120 (Feb. 23, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/02/00007-93359.pdf
[http://perma.cc/QL53-9GLG].
95. See id. at 1–2.
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devoted to combating online harassment.96 Elisa D’Amico and David
Bateman have contributed to these efforts by spearheading a pro bono
project, the Cyber Civil Rights Legal Project, at their firm K&L Gates.97
In short, law signals a tipping point for social norms that disapprove of
online abuse. As we demonstrate below, law has the potential to lead to
more speech and engagement online, contributing to even more profound
shifts in social norms. This could mean more contributions and
engagement by victims online. The next section provides empirical
evidence to support this proposition.
B. Empirical Support
Here we offer important empirical support for our theoretical
propositions. For this analysis and the empirical study discussed below, we
assume the existence of a cyberharassment law imposing tough civil and
criminal penalties for online conduct intended to terrorize or harass another
person. As explored above, such a law would signal that cyberharassment
is sufficiently harmful to warrant criminal and civil penalties.
One of us (Penney) has done significant empirical work on the chilling
effect in different related contexts.98 For this Article, Penney conducted an
original study that supports the supposition that cyberharassment law can
encourage victims to speak and engage online. The study involved an
online survey of over 1200 American internet users.99 It examined
96. One of us (Citron) is a member of an online harassment email listserv, which brings
together activists from various advocacy groups, victims, and journalists. The listserv has
been in operation for the past five years.
97. CYBER C.R. LEGAL PROJECT, https://www.cyberrightsproject.com/ [https://perma.cc/
P8HK-6Y5N] (last visited Feb. 21, 2019).
98. See generally JONATHON W. PENNEY, CHILLING EFFECTS: UNDERSTANDING THE
IMPACT OF SURVEILLANCE AND OTHER DIGITAL THREATS (forthcoming 2020); Penney,
Chilling Effects, supra note 14 (documenting chilling effects associated with the awareness
of online government surveillance); Jonathon W. Penney, Copyright’s Media Theory and the
Internet: The Case of the Chilling Effects Doctrine, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR THE
21ST CENTURY: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES 481 (B. Courtney Doagoo et al. eds.,
2014); Jonathon W. Penney, The Cycles of Global Telecommunication Censorship and
Surveillance, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 693 (2015) (not explicitly examining the idea of “chilling
effects,” but using historical case studies to explore similar impacts, including how
international censorship and surveillance chilled or deterred certain state practices and the
development of telecommunications technologies, such as how cable surveillance changed
how states and businesses communicated via the global telegraph system); Penney, Internet
Surveillance, supra note 14 (describing the chilling effects associated with a range of
regulatory activities, including state and corporate surveillance, and exploring differential
impacts among different groups); Jonathon W. Penney, Privacy, Chilling Effects, and
Personalized Legal Automation: The DMCA as an Empirical Case Study, 22 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (discussing an empirical case study documenting and exploring
chilling effects associated with algorithmic legal enforcement online); Jonathon W. Penney,
Three Chilling Effects Paradigms and Transatlantic Privacy, 25 EUR. L.J. (forthcoming
2019) (documenting chilling effects theory, research, and understanding through three
research paradigms).
99. The 1296 total survey responses were collected in March 2015, with sixty-four
survey responses excluded for being substantially incomplete (defined by ten or more
questions left unanswered—many of these were likely false starts by respondents), another
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participants’ responses to various hypothetical “regulatory” scenarios,
including one where the participant learns that the government has enacted
a new law introducing tough civil and criminal penalties for posting
information or other content online with the intent to harass or intimidate
another person.100
As noted in Part I, one of the primary critiques of cyberharassment laws
is that they have a chilling effect on speech. The survey attempted to
explore any possible chilling effect on the participants’ online activities (or
lack thereof) across a range of categories, including time spent online,
online speech, sharing of personally created content, online searches, and
social network site engagement, as well as privacy concerns. The study
also tested whether awareness of the cyberharassment law would work to
encourage participants to speak, share, contribute, and engage more online.
Survey respondents were recruited using an online platform, which has
yielded samples relatively representative of the U.S. internet-using
population.101 Responses were compiled and statistically analyzed in
relation to a range of demographic factors and reported traits, including age,
gender, education and income level, amount of time spent online, level of
online sharing, level of social network engagement, and privacy concerns in
response to the law.102
The results offered a number of insights. First, contrary to what many
civil libertarians argue, cyberharassment laws would have more salutary
than chilling effects for online engagement. For instance, 87 percent of
respondents indicated that a cyberharassment law would have “no impact”
or render them “somewhat more likely” or “much more likely” to “spend
time on the internet,” 62 percent indicated that such a law would have “no
impact” or render them “more likely” to “speak or write about certain topics
eighteen excluded for being completed too quickly, and two more screened because the
respondents had completed a version of the survey previously (in a field test).
100. For more extensive information on research design and methodology, see generally
Penney, Internet Surveillance, supra note 14.
101. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk provides an open crowdsourcing platform for task
creation, recruitment, compensation, and data collection. It has been used and validated as a
tool for a broad range of empirical, experimental, and behavioral studies. Gabriele Paolacci
& Jesse Chandler, Inside the Turk: Understanding Mechanical Turk as a Participant Pool,
23 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 184, 186 (2014); Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse Chandler
& Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT
& DECISION MAKING 411, 411–12 (2010); Panos G. Ipeirotis, Turker Demographics vs
Internet Demographics, COMPUTER SCIENTIST BUS. SCH. (Mar. 16, 2009),
http://www.behind-the-enemy-lines.com/2009/03/turker-demographics-vs-internet.html
[http://perma.cc/ALZ9-GGLS]
102. In the survey case study, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, a common
statistical method for analyzing survey data, was used to statistically analyze findings, as it
allowed for all relevant variables to be controlled in order to isolate relationships. STEVEN G.
HEERINGA, BRADY T. WEST & PATRICIA A. BERGLUND, APPLIED SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS
195, 235 (2d ed. 2017). Cohen’s f 2 was also used to test the effect size of findings, using the
conventional interpretation of small (0.02), medium (0.15), and large (0.35) values. JACOB
COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 413–14 (2d ed.
1988); TIMOTHY Z. KEITH, MULTIPLE REGRESSION AND BEYOND: AN INTRODUCTION TO
MULTIPLE REGRESSION AND STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING 62–63 (3d ed. 2019).
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online.” Sixty-seven percent indicated that the law would have “no impact”
or would render them “somewhat more likely” or “much more likely” to
share personally created content online, and 56 percent indicated that the
law would either have “no impact” or would render them “more likely” to
contribute to social networks online.
In short, there was little evidence to support claims that the law would
have substantial or significant chilling effects for online activities.
Respondents did largely agree (69 percent) with a statement that the law
would make them “more careful” about what they said in certain contexts
online, though more carefulness and thoughtfulness in online speech and
sharing is arguably not an undesirable outcome given present issues with
polarization, extreme rhetoric, and disinformation.103
Second, the law had a clear salutary impact on women’s online
contributions, sharing, and engagement. Female participants in the
survey—the predominant targets or victims of cyberharassment—said that
they were more likely to engage online in response to the cyberharassment
law.104 There was a statistically significant gender effect in response to the
proposed law, as seen in the findings set out in Table 1 below.

103. See, e.g., Daniel J. Coffey, Michael Kohler & Douglas M. Granger, Sparking
Debate: Campaigns, Social Media, and Political Incivility, in CONTROLLING THE MESSAGE:
NEW MEDIA IN AMERICAN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 245 (Victoria A. Farrar-Myers & Justin S.
Vaughn eds., 2015); Eric C. Miller, Book Review, 51 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 132, 132
(2014) (reviewing JOSEPH ZOMPETTI, DIVISIVE DISCOURSE: THE EXTREME RHETORIC OF
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS (2015)); Mark Richens, Want the Internet to Be Less
Mean? Think Before You Share, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 22, 2018, 10:30 AM),
http://www.wpr.org/want-internet-be-less-mean-think-you-share
[http://perma.cc/BZ7YXZAR]; Nick Robins-Early, How to Recognize a Fake News Story, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov.
27,
2016,
11:58
AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/fake-news-guidefacebook_us_5831c6aae4b058ce7aaba169 [https://perma.cc/S2JA-ETB3].
104. The study included 608 female participants and 600 male participants. Four
respondents skipped this specific question.
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Table 1: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Results Predicting
Respondents Being More Likely to Spend Time, Discuss, Share Personally
Created Content, or Engage with Social Networks Online in Response to
New Cyberharassment Law (Regression Coefficient with Standard Errors
in Parenthesis)105

Predictor
Age
Gender
Education
Level
Income
Level
Internet
Usage Level
Online
Sharing
Social
Network
Engagement
Privacy
Concerns

More Likely to
More Likely to
Speak About More Likely to
Spend Time
Certain Topics Share Online
Online
Online
0.08(0.03)***
0.01(0.04)
0.00(0.03)
0.15(0.04)***
0.07(0.05)
0.12(0.05)**

More Likely to
Contribute to
Social
Networks
0.00(0.04)
0.15(0.06)**

-0.00(0.03)

0.00(0.04)

0.03(0.04)

-0.04(0.04)

-0.10(0.02)

0.00(0.02)

-0.01(0.02)

-0.00(0.02)

0.03(0.03)

0.00(0.04)

0.04(0.04)

-0.07(0.04)

-0.03(0.02)

-0.01(0.03)

-0.03(0.03)

-0.03(0.03)

0.00(0.02)

0.02(0.02)

0.01(0.02)

0.06(0.02)

-0.11(0.02)***

-0.19(0.02)***

-0.24(0.02)***

-0.29(0.02)***

Given the way the gender variable was coded, these findings show that
women were statistically more likely to increase online engagement in light
of the law by three of the four engagement measures. They were more
likely to spend time online, more likely to share personally created or
authored content online, and more likely to contribute to social network
sites online. Though there was no gender effect for the “speech”
engagement measure (more or less likely to “speak or write online about
certain topics” in response to the law), this may be due to the fact that the
hypothetical law in the scenario facilitated the speech of both women and
men. It might also be a product of some women in the survey, especially
those who have experienced online harassment in the past, interpreting the
question in slightly different ways given its open-ended nature.106
Speaking more “about certain topics” online could include a variety of
subject matter, including those that may intimidate or harass.

105. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. All models significant (Prob > F = 0.00) with
medium and near medium effect sizes (Cohen’s f 2). All statistically significant results are
highlighted in bold.
106. Participants were asked, “Would this new law make you more likely or less likely to
speak or write about certain topics online?”
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Nevertheless, the potential salutary effect on women’s expression is clear
from the gender effects for the other online engagement measures. The
results suggest a tough cyberharassment law would encourage women to
share personally authored or created content online. Such a law would thus
encourage women’s contributions to social network sites. All of this
suggests that women are more likely to speak, engage, and express
themselves online in light of a cyberharassment law.
An additional takeaway from these findings is that those respondents
with privacy concerns about the hypothetical law were more negatively
impacted; they were statistically less likely to spend time online, speak,
share, and contribute on social networks. This suggests that women—who
were statistically more likely to engage in these measures—did not
predominantly indicate privacy concerns about the hypothetical law. This
is not surprising. Given that women are disproportionately targeted by
online harassment,107 which often includes serious privacy invasions, it
makes sense that if they had any privacy concerns it would be about the
harassment itself, not a law enacted to deter or prevent it. These findings
indicate that drafters of cyberharassment laws should take steps to allay
privacy concerns—such as transparency about detection and enforcement—
to minimize or limit any incidental negative impacts or chilling effects,
however modest.
III. IMPLICATIONS: SEXUAL PRIVACY AND BEYOND
Our argument that a cyberharassment law would have a salutary impact
on victims’ speech is consistent with expressive law theory and supported
by original empirical research. Although a comprehensive discussion of the
implications of expressive law impacts would take us beyond the scope of
this Article, here we discuss a few likely benefits.
A. Expressive Empowerment
A law with the effect of empowering and facilitating victim speech and
engagement would have a positive psychological effect on victims.
Victims would be more likely to speak out about their experiences and to
report them to law enforcement. These efforts would help legitimize past
and future reform efforts and generate additional media attention to impact
public sentiment, creating “norm cascades” that shift behavior in new
directions.108
The more victims speak out, the more victims who have retreated from
online engagement might return. A law that facilitates victim speech and
engagement can help empower victims and, in the long term, prevent,
mitigate, and reverse the negative impacts of online abuse and chilled
speech. Public discourse and broader democratic deliberation would be
enriched, with a wider array of voices, contributions, and perspectives,
107. CITRON, supra note 8, at 14–17.
108. Citron, supra note 17, at 410–11; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2033.
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especially those from women and members of marginalized groups, who
are most often targeted by online abuse.109
Victims could speak out against online abuse, giving them a sense of
empowerment that they have taken matters into their own hands.110 They
could dispel myths and misinformation about the abuse they face.111
Rather than speaking back to perpetrators (a risky proposition), victims’
supporters could generate positive support for targeted individuals.112 For
example, as one of us (Citron) documented in Hate Crimes in Cyberspace,
supporters of a feminist writer who was under assault online engaged in a
counter “Google bomb” that successfully raised the prominence of her
writings when searching for her name.113
As law encourages victims to reengage online or to continue speaking,
and as supporters speak out against online abuse, there will be enhanced
online dialogue.114 Victims can encourage counterspeech from third parties
using their resources and various forms of leverage. For example,
counterspeech by influential or high-profile people, or powerful private
sector intermediaries—like social media platforms—are far better situated
to affect and counter abusive activities.115
B. Implications for Sexual Privacy
Laws tackling other forms of online abuse—such as invasions of sexual
privacy—might have similar salutary effects on victims’ online
engagement.116 Invasions of sexual privacy include different ways that
people’s naked bodies and intimate activities are surveilled, recorded,
109. Citron, supra note 17, at 399; Waldman, supra note 17, at 3–4.
110. CITRON, supra note 8, at 108–10; Citron, supra note 17, at 399–400.
111. CITRON, supra note 8, at 108–10. But there are real risks; retaliation may be
ineffective at “naming and shaming” perpetrators and, worse, may lead to a serious
escalation in abuse. Id. at 110–11; Citron, supra note 17, at 400; Scott R. Stroud & William
Cox, The Varieties of Feminist Counterspeech in the Misogynistic Online World, in
MEDIATING MISOGYNY: GENDER, TECHNOLOGY, AND HARASSMENT 293, 303–08 (Jacqueline
Ryan Vickery & Tracy Everbach eds., 2018) (discussing the ethical dimensions of
counterspeech).
112. See Stroud & Cox, supra note 111, at 301–02 (“This strategy is also positive in that
it seeks to rebuild or increase the self-esteem and emotional valuing of the victim, thereby
keeping her online.”).
113. CITRON, supra note 8, at 70–71 (discussing the experience of feminist author Jill
Filipovic).
114. Citron, supra note 17, at 400; Stroud & Cox, supra note 111, at 303–05.
115. CITRON, supra note 8, at 241–42; Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton,
Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91
B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1471–76 (2011). For a discussion of the impact of influential
individuals, see Susan Benesch, Countering Dangerous Speech: New Ideas for Genocide
Prevention 14 (U.S. Holocaust Mem’l Museum, Working Paper, 2014),
https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/
20140212-benesch-countering-dangerous-speech.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M3L-VUGZ].
116. Citron, supra note 11 (manuscript at 4). Sexual privacy concerns the visibility of the
naked body and parts of the body closely associated with sex and gender. It involves the
solitude afforded intimate activities. It concerns the ability to decide whether to reveal one’s
sexual preferences or transgender status to others. See id. (manuscript at 10).
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exposed, disclosed, and manipulated without permission.117 For instance,
in a practice known as digital voyeurism, perpetrators secretly photograph
or videotape people as they undress or engage in sexually explicit
activities.118 Digital voyeurs further invade victims’ sexual privacy by
distributing their sexually graphic images without consent.119 Yet another
sexual-privacy invasion is sextortion—extortion or blackmail carried out
online involving a threat to release sexually explicit images of the victim if
the victim does not engage in further sexual activity.120
Invasions of sexual privacy have a profound impact on victims who are
denied agency over their intimate lives. They suffer crushing anxiety and
fear.121 They retreat from all aspects of on- and off-line life, including
online expression.122 As one of us (Citron) argued with Mary Anne Franks,
“[T]he nonconsensual disclosure of a person’s sexually explicit images
chills private expression based on the fear that the images would be shared
with the public at large. Without any expectation of privacy and
confidentiality, victims would not share their naked images.”123 Victims
often hide the abuse from those who could help them.124 Victims of
sextortion are explicitly told not to talk about the abuse or their attackers
will release their nude images.125
A Connecticut woman’s experience captures the way that sexual-privacy
invasions undermine victims’ freedom. After a woman discovered that her
ex-boyfriend’s gifts contained recording devices, she had “recurrent and
intrusive thoughts of being exposed and violated, [fear of] interference with
her personal relationships, [and] feelings of vulnerability and mistrust.”126
She explained that she “lives in a perpetual state of fear that someone is
watching or spying on her and she does not feel safe anywhere.”127
Given the profound harm of sexual-privacy invasions and their corrosive
chilling effects on victims’ expression and freedom,128 sexual-privacy laws
would have salutary effects on victim speech and engagement: they would
serve important speech-enhancing functions. Comprehensive sexual117. Id. (manuscript at 4).
118. Todd Magel, Man’s Arrest Prompts Hidden Camera Concerns in Central Iowa,
KCCI (Apr. 6, 2018, 5:24 PM), https://www.kcci.com/article/mans-arrest-prompts-hiddencamera-concerns-in-central-iowa/19706016 [https://perma.cc/T2QS-SR3T].
119. Citron & Franks, supra note 16, at 346.
120. See BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
SEXTORTION: CYBERSECURITY, TEENAGERS, AND REMOTE SEXUAL ASSAULT 11 (2016),
http://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/sextortion1-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/
DNB2-UFLK]; Quinta Jurecic, Sextortion, Online Harassment, and Violence Against
Women, LAWFARE (May 17, 2016, 11:46 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/sextortiononline-harassment-and-violence-against-women [https://perma.cc/8D6S-W6Y8].
121. BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., supra note 120, at 23.
122. Citron & Franks, supra note 16, at 385.
123. Id.
124. CITRON, supra note 8, at 29–30; Citron, supra note 11 (manuscript at 50).
125. CITRON, supra note 8, at 175–76.
126. Welsh v. Martinez, 114 A.3d 1231, 1244 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015).
127. Id. at 1242.
128. See CITRON, supra note 8, at 5–6.
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privacy legislation would signal broader public support for sexual-privacy
victims and the value of their online speech, contributions, and engagement.
Individuals and groups that have previously experienced sexual-privacy
violations or abuses—most likely women and minorities—could infer that
the majority values their online contributions, which would lead them to
greater engagement. They would thus be more likely to engage not only in
online expression, but sexual expression with intimate partners as well.
Though, as with expressive law scholarship more generally, further
empirical and theoretical work needs to be done to substantiate and support
these claims and hypotheses. Such a law would be invaluable not only to
our understanding of how law impacts behavior but also to better protect
sexual privacy and the dignity of victims.129
CONCLUSION
This Article aims to reframe the debate about laws addressing online
abuse. We debunk the notion that online-harassment laws will do more
damage than good to online expression. As our study and arguments show,
law is more likely to enhance speech than to chill it.
Our argument strikes at the core of the themes of the Fordham Law
Review’s Symposium on Gender Equality and the First Amendment for
which we wrote and presented this piece. Symposium participants raised
concerns about how the internet’s freedom-enhancing potential was not
being realized, especially for women and marginalized communities. We
offer this study as a sign of hope—both for what lawmakers, advocates, and
law enforcers have accomplished and for what is possible in the future.

129. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 205–06, 211 (1890) (describing the “right to an inviolate personality, [which] affords
alone that broad basis upon which the protection which the individual demands can be
rested”).

